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Why to Watch a Film Twice 
When I began writing film reviews, the editor of the magazine who had hired me told me
this basic principle: if you want to properly evaluate a film, you should always watch it
twice. The first time, he said, is for pleasure. The second time is for pleasure too, but a
different kind of pleasure. At that time, I did not completely understand the meaning of
his words.  Now, I  think I  have finally understood what he meant.  Moving from film
criticism to the philosophy of film has helped me to clarify this principle. 
We should watch a film twice since there are two important sources of pleasure in a
film, and we find it hard to fully enjoy them both if we only watch the film once. The first
source of pleasure is the exploration of a world, the second one is the appreciation of an
artifact. These two sources of pleasure are distinct and yet connected. This paper aims at
providing an account of the film experience that can explain both their distinctness and
their connection.
For this purpose, I will develop Richard Wollheim’s (1980) idea that the pictorial
experience involves two folds. More specifically, I will argue that in the case of the film
experience these folds are to be understood as two distinct temporal series, which can
provide us with different kinds of pleasure (§§ 1-2). Conceiving of the cinematic folds as
temporal series will lead me to reformulate the traditional distinction between diegetic
and non-diegetic  features  of  a  film,  thereby highlighting  two different  kinds  of  non-
diegetic features, which play a different role in our appreciation of films (§§ 3-5). Then, I
will  compare  my account  of  film experience  and appreciation,  which  rests  upon the
notion of  temporal  series,  with alternative  accounts,  which rest  upon notions  such as
imagination, intention, and embodiment (§§ 6-7). Finally, I will exemplify my account of
film experience and appreciation by analyzing a film segment (§ 8).
1. C-series and R-series
With  the  aim  of  articulating  the  “requirement  upon  the  seeing  appropriate  to
representations”, Wollheim (1980, 142–143) introduces “the twofold thesis” stating that,
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while  looking  at  a  picture,  “visual  attention  must  be  distributed  between  two things
though  of  course  it  need  not  be  equally  distributed  between  them […] what  I  have
expressed  as  seeing  the  medium versus  seeing  the  object”.  In  this  sense,  a  pictorial
experience involves two experiential folds, one directed to the picture’s surface (i.e. the
medium) and the other to the scene depicted (i.e. the object). For the film experience is a
kind of pictorial experience, one can conceive of it as a twofold experience, whose folds
represent the screen’s surface and the world depicted respectively (see Hopkins 2009,
69).
I  argue  that,  in  virtue  of  the  peculiar  temporality  of  films  with  respect  to  still
pictures, the two folds of the film experience should be characterized as temporal series.
More  specifically,  the  film  experience  is  constituted  by  both  a  temporal  series  that
concerns an enlightened screen in a theater (or in some other place) and a temporal series
that  consists  of  perspectives  on  the  world  depicted.  Borrowing  Wollheim’s  (1998)
adjectives, I will call “Configurational Series” (C-series) the former and “Recognitional
Series” (R-series) the latter. While twofoldness is the hallmark of the pictorial experience
in general, twoseriesness is the specific hallmark of the cinematic experience. i Comparing
the C-series  and the R-series  with the two melodies  that  constitute  a polyphony,  one
might also treat the film experience as a polyphonic experience (for a similar use of the
notion of polyphony in the case of speech acts, see Bachtin 1981; Ducrot 1998; Recanati
1981).
The C-series and the R-series are often conflated in the debates about films. A clue
of this is the use of expressions such as ‘camera movement’ or ‘editing cut’ to designate
not only something experienced in the C-series (namely, some features of the film as an
artifact) but also something in the R-series (namely, some changes in the perspective on
the world depicted). Yet, I argue, a proper account of the film experience requires that
one  treats  the  C-series  and the  R-series  as  distinct  and yet  connected.  My aim is  to
investigate their distinctness and their connection in order to explain the distinctness and
the connection of two sources of pleasure in the film experience, namely, the exploration
of  a  world  and  the  appreciation  of  an  artifact.  Just  as  the  pleasure  we  take  in  the
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exploration of a world primarily comes from the R-series, the pleasure we take in the
appreciation of the film as an artifact primarily comes from the C-series. Thus, we can
dub the former  R-pleasure and the latter  C-pleasure.  By providing an account of the
relationship  between  the  C-series  and  the  R-series,  I  will  provide  an  account  of  the
relationship between the C-pleasure and the R-pleasure.
Both the C-series and the R-series are experiences in the sense figured out by Peter
Strawson  (1966),  who  conceives  of  an  experience  as  a  subjective  route  through  an
objective world. On the one hand, the R-series is a subjective route through the world
depicted. On the other hand, the C-series is a phase of a wider subjective route through
the actual world, i.e. the spectator’s lifelong experience. More specifically, the C-series is
the phase of the spectator’s lifelong experience that focuses on a certain artifact in the
actual world, namely the film screened.
Both the R-series and the C-series exhibit  a subjective temporal order, which is
distinct from the objective spatiotemporal order of the world explored. For instance, in
the R-series, I can see an eagle flying in the sky and then a horse running in a field; yet,
in the objective order of the world depicted, the eagle is flying while the horse is running.
Likewise,  in  the  C-series,  I  can  watch  the  screen  and  then  take  a  look at  my friend
munching popcorn in the near place; yet, in the objective order of the actual world, my
friend is munching popcorn while the film is being screened.
However, there is a key difference between the C-series and the R-series in this
respect.  In  the  C-series  (and,  more  generally,  in  ordinary  experience),  the  subjective
temporal  order  of  my  experience  is  determined  by  the  position  of  my  body  in  the
objective  spatiotemporal  order  of  the  actual  world.  In  other  words,  the  series  of
perspectives that constitutes my experience as a subjective temporal series is determined
by the series of standpoints that my body occupies in the objective spatiotemporal order
of the actual world. By contrast, in the R-series there is no constraint of this sort. My
series of perspectives on the world depicted is independent of the position of my body in
the objective spatiotemporal order of the world depicted. That is because I have no body
in the world depicted. In this sense, we might say that the C-series involves an embodied
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experience whereas the R-series involves a disembodied experience. 
Here is a specificity of the film experience that can be a source of pleasure for the
spectator. In the R-series, we can explore the world depicted in a way that is precluded in
our ordinary experience of the actual world, namely, by enjoying a series of perspectives
on a world that is independent of the position of our body in that world. This is the core
of what I have called the R-pleasure.
An important consequence of this difference is the following. On the one hand, the
C-series is an experiential route through an objective world to which the experience itself
belongs (as far as the experience belongs to the body that determines the experiential
route). On the other hand, the R-series is an experiential route through an objective world
to which the experience itself does not belong. In short, the C-series is an experience
from the inside whereas the R-series is an experience from the outside. 
As a disembodied experience from the outside, the R-series, unlike the C-series,
does not make room for action and interaction. In fact, in the C-series, one can interact
with the object experienced because one can do so by means of one’s body. For instance,
in the C-series I can move towards the screen and possibly touch it, whereas, in the R-
series I cannot move towards the individuals depicted and touch them. The R-series is an
experiential route through an objective world that prevents the subject of experience from
acting in that world and interacting with the inhabitants of that world. As a consequence
of  that,  the  R-series,  unlike  the  C-series,  surely  does  not  make  room  for  sensory
modalities such as touch or taste, which involve experiences in which the body shows up
(for instance, my experience of touching a table involves experiencing a contact between
my body and this table).
Among  the  actions  precluded  to  the  subject  in  the  R-series,  there  is  also  the
possibility to change the viewpoint by changing the position of the body. While the C-
series is a series of perspectives that are  chosen, the R-series is a series of perspectives
that are imposed. Yet, in the R-series itself, there is no answer to the question: imposed
by who? The answer to this question lies in the C-series, in which the film is experienced
as an artifact that has been designed in order to determine our exploration of the world
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depicted. In the R-series, the perspectives are imposed just in the sense that there is no
alternative to them: one cannot chose one’s perspectives, but only enjoy them.
This  is  the  price  that  the  R-series  must  pay in  order  to  provide  the  subject  of
experience  with  a  disembodied  experience  from  without  the  world  depicted.
Nevertheless, this lack of freedom can be a source of pleasure, as far as in the R-series we
are released from the burden of action, interaction and decision. We have no longer to
choose our viewpoint by positioning our body in the world, and to face the consequences
of  this  choice.  Viewpoints  come for  free,  so to  say,  and we can  simply  enjoy them
without worrying about our choices and their possible consequences. This is another key
feature of what I have called the R-pleasure.
Another  important  feature  of  the  R-pleasure,  which  is  in  turn  related  to  the
disembodied character of the R-series, comes from the possibility of discontinuity.  In
ordinary experience – and thus in the C-series, which is just a phase of it – the perceptual
route through the actual world is continuous since the series of subjective perspectives is
determined  by  the  series  of  positions  of  the  subject’s  body,  which  can  move  only
continuously. By contrast, in the R-series the perceptual route through the world depicted
does  not  depend  on  the  position  of  the  subject’s  body,  and  thus  can  involve
discontinuities.
More specifically, the R-series can involve both spatial discontinuity and temporal
discontinuity. The former allows the subject to change the viewpoint from place A at time
T to place B at time T’ (which is the immediate successor of T in the objective temporal
order)  without experiencing a continuous movement from A to  B. The latter allows the
subject to change the viewpoint from place A at time T to place to place B (or, possibly, A
itself) at time  T* (which is  not  the immediate successor of  T in the objective temporal
order) without experiencing a continuous duration from T to T*. Editing cuts are the ways
in which such experiential discontinuities are implemented in the film as an artifact, and
one can actually appreciate such an implementation in the C-series. Yet, in the R-series,
what in the C-series we called ‘editing cuts’ are no longer  editing cuts  (understood as
features of the film as an artifact), but rather spatial or temporal jumps in the subjective
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route through the world depicted. Enjoying such experiential jumps is another important
component of what I have called the R-pleasure.
2. C-pleasure and R-pleasure
The R-pleasure, whose basic traits I have sketched just above, is the basic pleasure that
one can take in watching a film. This is shared by all moviegoers. Overlooking the R-
pleasure means overintellectualizing the film experience. However, cinema provides us
with  another  important  source  of  pleasure  that  is  worth  highlighting.  This  is  the  C-
pleasure, which is not alternative to the R-pleasure but rather complementary to it. 
In fact, the R-pleasure, as such, is not simply a pleasure one takes in the scene
depicted. Rather, this is the pleasure one takes in the peculiar experience of the scene
depicted that films provide us with, namely the R-series (see previous section). On the
one  hand,  the  R-series  exhibits  a  specific  way of  presenting  the  scene  depicted  that
distinguishes it  from ordinary perception.  On the other hand, the C-series helps us to
make such a specificity explicit by revealing where it comes from.
In this sense, the C-pleasure arises from the etiological question: what caused my
R-pleasure? While the R-pleasure consists in the exploration of a world, the C-pleasure
consists in the appreciation of the artifact that makes such an exploration possible. This
artifact is the film, which we initially encounter in the C-series as a configuration of light
on a screen. The C-pleasure involves treating such a configuration as the link between the
film as a complex artifact having a distinctive history of production on the one hand, and
the exploration of a world that this artifact supplies us on the other. 
Films  are artifacts  whose primary function is  the generation of an R-series  that
provides  us  with  an  R-pleasure.  Still,  in  watching  a  film,  we can  also  focus  on  the
functioning of the artifact itself (instead of limiting ourselves to enjoy its effects), thereby
enjoying a C-pleasure. We can do so by means of a cognitive process that consists in
tracing valuable experiences back to their causes. Following Wollheim (1980, 1984), I
will call this process retrieval.
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Although  there are films that patently reveal themselves as artifacts, for example
the  so-called  Brechtian  films  like  Une femme est  une femme  (J.-L Godard,  1961)  or
Othon  (J-M. Straub and D. Huillet, 1969),  traditional narrative  cinema normally favors
the exploration of the world depicted in the R-series. However, the spectator can always
appreciate  any film also  as  an  artifact  by  means  of  cinematic  retrieval.  This  can  be
characterized as the process of tracing the R-series back to its causes through three kinds
of awareness. First, the awareness that the R-series is caused, in the C-series, by patterns
of light upon the screen and sounds coming from the speakers. Second, the awareness
that there is a template (e.g. a film strip, a disk, a file) enabling the showing of such lights
and sounds. Third, the awareness that this template is linked to a historical chain that
originates in the creative action of a maker who intended to elicit certain responses from
the audience. In sum, tracing the R-series back to  a configured surface in the C-series
leads us to wonder where this configuration comes from, thereby tracing it back to its
history  of  production.  This  is  the  cinematic  retrieval  from  which  the  C-pleasure
originates. 
The cornerstone of the C-pleasure is the acknowledgment that our perspective on
the world depicted is in fact a shot that is currently projected on the screen and that was
produced  through  a  camera  (or  some  alternative  technical  device  such  as  computer
graphics).  In  this  sense,  the  range  of  our  perspective  (in  the  R-series)  on  the  world
depicted corresponds to the frame of the shot that is screened (in the C-series).
The  frame,  understood  as  the  shape  of  the  screened  shot,  is  the  most  basic
configurational feature of cinema since it appears in any moving picture.  Even if one
endorses  the  thesis  that  moving  pictures  constituting  documentaries,  audiovisual
recordings or live television are “transparent” (see Walton 1984), that is, they put us in
perceptual  contact  with real  events,  one should  still  acknowledge that  the experience
elicited by such transparent pictures, unlike ordinary perception, essentially involves a
frame. In fact, the experience of documentaries, audiovisual recordings or live television
sharply differs from ordinary perception first of all because the content of the former,
unlike the content of the latter, is framed. 
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To sum up, the exploration of the world depicted that one enjoys in the R-series
rests upon the frame, which one can experience in the C-series. Even in a moving image
that leads us to focus on the R-series thereby minimizing the role of the C-series, the
frame keeps playing a fundamental role. For instance, the frame plays a crucial role in
early films such as Lumière Brothers’ vues, just as in the digital videos one can nowadays
make using one’s smartphones. Ultimately, the frame is the basic formal constituent of
any film, and we can appreciate it in the C-series as providing us with the perspective on
the world depicted that we enjoy in the R-series.
3. Perceptual non-diegetic features
The frame is not part of the world depicted. ‘Being framed’ is not a property of the scene
we see, but only of our experience of it. At most, if we are watching a documentary, we
can infer from the frame that a camera was there in face of the scene depicted, but the
frame  itself  is  not  something  that  inheres  in  the  scene  depicted.  Film  scholars  (see
Souriau 1951; Metz 1977), as well as philosophers of film (see Wilson 2011; Livingston
2013), usually call “diegetic features” those features that inhere in the world depicted and
“non-diegetic features” those that do not. Framing, in this sense, is a non-diegetic feature;
indeed, it is the most basic non-diegetic feature, which enables us to visually experience
diegetic features.
I will call framing a perceptual non-diegetic feature (or perceptual feature for short)
since it  does not  inhere in the world depicted but nevertheless  affects  our perceptual
experience of that world. As an essential feature of any film, framing is the most basic
perceptual non-diegetic feature. Yet, it is not the only one. Editing also is a  perceptual
feature,  just  as framing is.  The difference is  that,  in principle,  a film can do without
editing but it cannot do without framing. Indeed, editing itself requires framing whereas
framing does not require editing.
While framing provides us with a perspective on the world depicted, and possibly
allows  us  to  continuously  change  this  perspective  by  means  of  camera  movements,
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editing enables us to discontinuously change this perspective. Thus, an editing cut in the
C-series corresponds to a jump of perspective in the R-series. By undergoing this jump
we can  enjoy  an  R-pleasure,  which  concerns  our  exploration  of  the  world  depicted.
Moreover, by tracing this jump back to its cause (i.e. a skillful activity of cutting and
linking motion pictures), we can enjoy a C-pleasure, which concerns our appreciation of
the film as an artifact.
Here  is  the  reason  why  the  technical  terms  used  in  our  reports  of  cinematic
experiences – and especially those used by film critics in their reviews – are somehow
misleading. By speaking of an ‛amazing camera movement’ or of an ‛impressive editing
cut’, one wrongly suggests that what we primarily experience is a configuration in the C-
series. In spite of their wordiness, ‛continuous change of viewpoint caused by a camera
movement’ and ‛discontinuous change of viewpoint caused by an editing cut’ would be
better reports of our experience. The reason is that the latter expressions rightly suggest
that what we primarily experience are perceptual effects in the R-series, which we can
then trace back to the configuration in the C-series that caused them. 
In addition to framing and editing, there are two others kinds of perceptual features
that can significantly contribute to both our R-pleasure and our C-pleasure in watching a
film. These are visual texture and film music. By ‘visual texture’ I mean a special use of
cinematography  in  virtue  of  which  our  visual  experience  of  the  scene  depicted
significantly differs from a putative ordinary perception of the same scene from the same
perspective. The black and white cinematography is a paradigmatic case of this.
In watching a black and white film, we do not experience the things depicted as
being black and white. In this sense, the black and white is not a diegetic feature. Yet, it
would be hasty to claim that black and white is nothing but a feature of the film as an
artifact that we experience in the C-series. This would amount to overintellectualizing the
film experience. In fact, the black and white also plays a role in the R-series, inasmuch as
it affects our visual experience of the world depicted. Although we do not represent the
things depicted as being black and white, we do represent-as-black-and-white the things
depicted. That is to say that black and white is not a feature we ascribe to what we see,
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but rather a modifier of our visual experience of such things. In an ideal report of our
seeing  the  things  depicted  in  the  film,  ‘black  and  white’  would  not  function  as  an
adjective  that  applies  to  ‘things’  but  rather  as  an  adverb  that  applies  to  ‘seeing’.
Borrowing a distinction from the philosophy of mind, we might say that the black and
white is not part of the content of our experience, i.e. what we experience, but rather of its
mode  or  attitude,  i.e.  how  we  experience (see  Brentano  1973;  Crane  2003;  Kriegel
2015).ii
Film music functions in a similar way. On the one hand, we do not experience film
music (viz. the musical score of a film) as belonging to the world depicted. This is the
basic difference between film music and diegetic sounds such as noises, dialogues or the
music played within a certain scene. On the other hand, film music does not come down
to a feature of the film as an artifact that we enjoy in the C-series. Film music also play a
role  in  the  R-series,  inasmuch  as  it  affects  our  perceptual  experience  of  the  world
depicted. We do not represent the things depicted as producing film music, and yet we
represent-as-imbued-with-music the things depicted. Film music metaphorically “colors”
our  experience  of  the  world  depicted  just  as  the  black  and white  literally  colors  (or
discolors, if you prefer) this very experience. In sum, the fact that film music is not to be
experienced as a feature of the scene that we enjoy in the R-series does not mean that it
should be exclusively experienced as a feature of the film that we appreciate as an artifact
in the C-series. There is room for an experience of film music in the R-series, not as a
feature of the content of our experience, but as a feature of our very experience. 
In his essay “Film Music and Narrative Agency” (1996), Jerrold Levinson argues
that the spectator experiences film music either as the communicative act of the narrator
within the fictional world or as the communicative act of an implicit filmmaker in the real
world.  In  both  cases,  film  music  is  experienced  as  the  outcome  of  an  agency.  The
distinction is only between a fictional agency (the narrator) and a purportedly real agency
(the implicit filmmaker).
I argue that the notion of an R-series reveals a basic level of the experience of film
music that Levinson overlooks. At this level, we can experience film music as a modifier
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of our experience in the R-series, independently of the mediation of any agency. In fact,
Levinson (1996, 266) mentions the possibility that film music could be experienced as
“an atmosphere”,  as “a mood” of the presentation  of a scene,  but  he treats  this  as a
secondary case of little interest. By contrast, I argue that such an auditory atmosphere
enveloping the scene depicted is the primary way in which one usually experiences film
music.  The communicative  functions  that  Levinson attributes  to  film music  are  only
secondarily derived from this basic cinematic experience, by tracing it back to its alleged
causes. 
Treating film music as a perceptual  modifier  of the R-series allows us to make
sense of an apparently unsound commonplace in film studies,  which Levinson (1996,
250) stigmatizes: “that nondiegetic film music is standardly ‘inaudible’, i.e. is not, and is
not meant  to be,  consciously heard,  attended to,  or noticed.  This seems to be clearly
false”. On the one hand, I am inclined to agree with Levinson’s criticism of the claim that
film music is inaudible. On the other hand, I think that there is a more charitable reading
of the commonplace of the inaudibility of film music that can help us to make sense of
this. 
The idea is to interpret the attitude of the audience not as a total lack of auditory
attention, but rather as a way of experiencing film music as a modifier of the R-series
through which the audience perceives the world depicted. What in the commonplace is
roughly called “inaudible film music” can be better  understood in terms of a musical
sound that is primarily experienced neither as belonging to the scene depicted nor to the
film as an artifact. The “inaudible music” is inaudible in the sense that is not primarily
heard as a content of the spectator’s experience, i.e. as something produced in the world
depicted or as the skillful work of a composer or as the skillful selection of a filmmaker
or, in Levinson favorite conception, as the communicative move of a fictional narrator.
Yet, even though film music is not part of content of the spectator’s experience (either in
the R-series or in the C-series), it is not completely unperceived. Indeed, it can be felt as a
modifier of the way in which the spectator experiences the content provided by the R-
series. In this sense film music is an attitudinal feature of the R-series; it contributes to
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the attitude of this series towards its content. 
Just as treating film music as an attitudinal feature of the R-series helps us to make
sense  of  the  commonplace  according  to  which  film music  would  be  “inaudible”,  so
treating camera movements and editing cuts as attitudinal features of the R-series helps us
to make sense of another film studies’ commonplace, according to which in many films
camera movements and editing cuts are “invisible” or “transparent” (especially in the so-
called classical Hollywood movies, see Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson 1985). Camera
movements and editing cut may be “invisible” or “transparent” to the extent that we can
experience them not as the outcome of an agency but rather as attitudinal features of the
R-series,  which gives  us perceptual  access  to  the world depicted.  That  is  to  say that
“invisible” camera movements and “transparent” editing cuts allow us to keep enjoying
our experience in the R-series without being forced to tracing it back to its causes in the
C-series. 
In sum, perceptual non-diegetic features operate at two different levels. First, we
can enjoy these features in the R-series as special features of our experience of the world
depicted, and this can elicit a special R-pleasure since such features allow us to perceive
the world depicted in a special way, which is different from ordinary perception. Second,
we can trace the experience we undergo in the R-series back to what caused it in the C-
series. This leads us to acknowledge that the screened film that we experience in the C-
series  is  the  exhibition  of  an  artifact,  which  has  been  provided  with  the  visual  and
auditory features that are responsible for our peculiar experience (in the R-series) of the
world depicted. In this way, we can enjoy a different kind of pleasure, namely the C-
pleasure, which comes from the appreciation of the skillful achievement that has caused
our R-pleasure. In savoring the C-pleasure provided by perceptual non-diegetic features,
we, so to say, turn the “adverbs” of the film experience that we enjoyed in the R-series
into the “adjectives” of the film as an artifact that we appreciate in the C-series. 
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4. Discursive non-diegetic features
Perceptual non-diegetic features such as framing, editing,  visual texture or film music
essentially  differ  from  other  non-diegetic  features  such  as  intertitles,  superimposed
inscriptions,  or voices over (e.g.  the voices of narrators). The latter  do not shape our
perceptual  experience  of  the  world  depicted,  but  rather  provides  us  with  discursive
contents that supplement this experience. However, such features also are non-diegetic
since they do not belong to the world depicted. Therefore, I will call them discursive non-
diegetic features (or discursive features for short). 
Unlike  perceptual  features,  discursive  features  play  no  role  in  our  perceptual
experience  of  the  world  depicted  that  we  enjoy  in  the  R-series.  That  is  to  say  that
discursive features have their place only in the C-series and therefore we only experience
them as features of the film as an artifact. More specifically, such features are the way in
which the film as an artifact (or, if you prefer, the agency who is responsible for this
artifact) provides us with some pieces of information (or comments) about what is going
on in the world depicted.
Filmmakers can use discursive features to force spectators to shift their attention
from the experience of the world depicted to the film as an artifact that has led to this
experience. The “Brechtian” intertitles in 2 ou 3 choses que je sais d’elle (J.-L. Godard,
1967) are  of  this  kind.  However,  discursive features  are  usually  avoided as  much as
possible  in traditional  narrative cinema,  whose implicit  challenge consists in telling a
story by  showing  as much as possible what is going on, that is, by relying as much as
possible on the R-series (see McKee 1997). In this sense, film critics often deplore the
use of the voice over, especially when this seems to be a clue of the incapacity of the
filmmaker to provide us with a perceptual experience of some crucial  passages of the
story – see for instance some reviews of films such as  The Gangs of New York  (M.
Scorsese, 2002) or Vicky Cristina Barcelona (W. Allen, 2008), e.g. Romney (2003) and
Rowson (2009) respectively.iii
Ultimately, discursive non-diegetic features can only contribute to the C-pleasure,
not to the R-pleasure. When a filmmaker exploit such features, she communicates with us
directly in the C-series by overtaking our perceptual experience of the world depicted that
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occurs  in  the  R-series.  Thus,  our  appreciation  of  such  features  does  not  come  from
wondering what in the C-series caused our experience in the R-series. We appreciate such
features by directly grasping them in the C-series, that is, by directly treating them as
features of the film as an artifact.
While perceptual  features  emphasize  the  perceptual  dimension  of  the  film
experience,  discursive  features  emphasize  its  cognitive  dimension.  Indeed,  discursive
features lead us to shift our attention from the world depicted in R-series to the film as an
artifact in the C-series. Conversely, perceptual features like the black and white or film
music, let alone editing and camera movements, do not primarily bring us back to the
film as an artifact, but rather make us perceive the world depicted in a certain way.
However, perceptual features can also be experienced by tracing them back to their
real causes, that is, to the achievement of a filmmaker. Yet, I argue, such an achievement
can  be  fully  appreciated  only  secondarily,  as  the  agency  that  contrived  the  R-series
experience as an apparently-not-contrived effect. In this sense, we can conceive of film-
making as the design of a special experience, namely the R-series experience, which is
primarily  experienced  as  not  designed.  Consider  for  example  the  black  and white  in
Manhattan  (W. Allen, 1979), the editing in  The Godfather  (F. Coppola, 1972), or the
camera  movements  in  Satantango  (B.  Tarr,  1994).iv The  spectator  enjoys  such  non-
diegetic  features primarily as a perceptual  effects,  as a special  way of perceiving the
world depicted. It is only at a secondary stage that these perceptual non-diegetic features
are also appreciated as the skillful (and possibly expressive or symbolic) achievement of
an  agent  who  purposely  produced  such  perceptual  effects.  Discursive  non-diegetic
features, instead, directly put us in contact with some agency. 
5. Diegetic features
Both perceptual and discursive features are non-diegetic, that is, they do not inhere in the
world depicted. There is no framing, no editing, no black and white, no film music, no
intertitles or superimposed inscriptions in the world depicted. Instead, the world depicted
is inhabited by a variety of individuals having their distinctive properties and relations.
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Such individuals, properties and relations constitute the diegetic features of a film.
For  the  R-series  is  a  series  of  perspectives  on the  world  depicted,  the  diegetic
features, as features of the world depicted, play a crucial role in this series. Yet, the role
of the diegetic features in the R-series is essentially different from that of the perceptual
non-diegetic  features in this  very series. The diegetic  features concern  what a certain
perspective in the R-series represents, namely its content, whereas the perceptual features
concern  how  this  perspective  represents  its  content.  As seen above,  framing,  editing,
visual texture and film music,  understood as constituents of the R-series, are all  non-
diegetic perceptual features, inasmuch as they concern how we perceptually represent the
world depicted. Still, in order to provide an exhaustive account of the R-series, we should
consider also the diegetic features. The point is that a perspective makes sense only if it is
understood as a perspective  on something. The diegetic features allows us to figure out
this something.
It is at the level of the diegetic features that we can distinguish between fiction
films and non-fiction films. In the latter, the diegetic features simply are the features of
our actual world, whereas in the former the diegetic features concern a fictional world,
which may exhibit some relevant affinities with our world (as in the case of biographical
or historical movies) but remains substantially different from it in virtue of providing us
with different perceptual contents. In this sense, there is a substantial difference between
a documentary, which provides us with perceptual perspectives on the actual world, and a
docudrama,  which  provides  us  with  perceptual  perspectives  on  a  fictional  world  that
resembles to (or stands for) the actual one.v
For diegetic features play a key role in constituting the R-series, they play a key
role also in eliciting the R-pleasure that we can take in this series. That is to say that the
R-pleasure  comes  not  only  from the  special  way (disembodied,  from the  outside)  in
which we perceive the things depicted, but also from the very nature of such things. The
R-pleasure depends not only on how the film allows us to represents a certain content in
the R-series, but also on what it allows us to represent, i.e. this very content.
Just as we can trace the perceptual non-diegetic features in the R-series back to the
16
corresponding features of the film as an artifact in the C-series, we can do the same for
the diegetic features. The things that we enjoy in the R-series as features of the world
depicted can also be appreciated in the C-series as components of the film as an artifact.
For instance, the events that we enjoy in the R-series correspond to a certain screenplay
that we can appreciate in the C-series, the places that we enjoy in the R-series correspond
to a certain production design that we can appreciate in the C-series, the individuals that
we enjoy in the R-series correspond to a certain acting (or computer graphics) that we can
appreciate in the C-series, and so on and so forth. The C-pleasure that we can take in
diegetic  features  precisely  consists  in  appreciating  what  in  the  C-series  caused  the
contents of our experience in the R-series.
6. Alternative models of film experience and appreciation 
The distinction  between  diegetic  and  non-diegetic  features  allows  us  to  compare  the
twoserieness  model  of  film  experience  and  appreciation  proposed  so  far  with  two
alternative  models.  These have been proposed by George Wilson (2011) and Paisley
Livingston (2013) in the framework of the debate on the role of the imagination in the
experience of fiction films. 
According to  Wilson’s  “Mediated  Version  of  the  Imagined  Seeing Thesis”,  the
spectator of a fiction film imagines to see a sort of imaginary recording that shows her the
fictional  events  that  this  film  depicts.  Thus,  the  spectator  imagines  perceiving  the
fictional  events  in  virtue  of  the  mediation of  such  an  imaginary  recording.  Yet  the
spectator is not forced to imagine anything about the way in which such a recording is
produced.  In  Wilson’s  (2011,  47)  terms,  it  is  “fictionally  indeterminate”  how  these
recordings are produced.
By claiming that the viewer imagines to see a sort of imaginary recording, Wilson’s
account can easily deal with non-diegetic features without the need to refer to the history
of making of the actual film. It suffices that the viewer imagines such features as non-
diegetic features of the imaginary recording. If a film is in black and white, for example,
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the spectator imagines that the imaginary recording has a black and white texture. Thus,
Wilson  provides  us  with  a  unitary  account  according  to  which  the  spectator  can
experience and appreciate both diegetic and non-diegetic features within the framework
of the fictional world.
By contrast, Livingston proposes an “Appreciator Version of the Imagined Seeing
Thesis”,  according  to  which  diegetic  and  non-diegetic  features  are  separately
experienced. While the spectator imagines perceiving the diegetic features of the depicted
scene, she appreciates the non-diegetic features by scrutinizing the real vehicle (i.e. the
film as an artifact) that produces such an impression. As Livingston (2013, 144) puts it,
“The absence of colors is for the competent and informed spectator a familiar feature of
black and white photography in the actual world, and not necessarily to be reasoned about
as the vestige of some obscure story-internal mediation. Good appreciators of movies pay
attention to attributes of the audio-visual presentation such as color, grain, focus, aspect
ratio, depth of field, and editing, and they are warranted to think of these features in terms
of the filmmaking strategies of the actual filmmakers who have been operating within the
constraints of available cinematic technology”. 
I argue that both Wilson’s Mediated Version and Livingston’s Appreciator Version
cannot adequately deal with non-diegetic features. On the one hand, Wilson’s Mediated
Version treats all the non-diegetic features of the real film as non-diegetic features of the
imaginary film thereby forcing the spectator of, say, a black and white film to imagine a
fictional documentary made in black and white, instead of simply acknowledging that the
real  movie  has  been  made  in  black  and  white.  On  the  other  hand,  Livingston’s
Appreciator  Version  forces  the  spectator  to  treat  all  the  non-diegetic  features  as
exclusively belonging to the film as an artifact, thereby splitting the spectator’s attention
between the latter  and the world depicted.  For example, the spectators of a black and
white  film  should experience  the scene depicted  as  being  colored,  and the  cinematic
artifact as being black and white. While Wilson’s Mediated Version requires an excessive
effort of imagination from spectators, Livingston’s Appreciator Version seems to require
an excessive effort of selective attention.
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The point is that both the Wilson’s Mediated Version and Livingston’s Appreciator
Version, in spite of their  contrasting views, put all  non-diegetic  features on the same
level. According to Wilson’s Mediated Version all non-diegetic features are experienced
as belonging to the imaginary recording, whereas according to Livingston’s Appreciator
Version all such features are experienced as features of the film as an artifact. Yet, as I
have showed above, there is a relevant  distinction between two kinds of non-diegetic
features, namely, perceptual features, which shape our experience of the world depicted,
and  discursive  features,  which  provides  us  with  further  pieces  of  information  or
comments  on  the  world  depicted.  Both  Wilson’s  Mediated  Version  and  Livingston’s
Appreciator Version overlook this distinction thereby conflating perceptual non-diegetic
features with discursive ones. Instead, in the model of film experience and appreciation
that I have proposed, these two kinds of non-diegetic features can be effectively keep
distinct. That is because my model locates different kinds of features in different places;
the diegetic features in the content of the R-series (as features of the world depicted); the
perceptual  non-diegetic  features  in  the  attitude of  the  R-series (as  features  of  the
perceptual experience of the world depicted); the discursive non-diegetic features in the
content of  the  C-series (as  features  of  the  film as  an  artifact).  That  being  the  case,
perceptual features such as the black and white are primarily enjoyed in the R-series; they
can  be  appreciated  also  in  the  C-series,  as  Livingston  rightly  points  out,  but  only
secondarily, as the result of a retrieval. We primarily experience-as-black-and-white the
world depicted, even though we can trace this experience back to its cause thereby also
appreciating the film as a black and white artifact.
7. Intentions and embodiment 
The models of film experience and appreciation that I have discussed so far mainly focus
on the perceptual and imaginative states of the spectator. Still, there are scholars who, by
relying on linguistic pragmatics, cognitive science and neuroscience, have argued that the
spectator’s uptake of the filmmaker’s intentions, just as the spectator’s bodily reactions,
also play a crucial  role  in  film experience and appreciation  (for the emphasis  on the
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uptake of intentions, see Donati 2006; Kobow 2007; Pignocchi 2015; for the emphasis on
embodiment,  see  Sobchack  1992;  Anderson  1996;  Gallese  and  Guerra  2012;  Zacks
2015). I contend that the distinction between C-series and R-series paves the way for a
unified  account  of  film  experience  and  appreciation  in  which  all  these  different
components can find their proper place.
The perceptual and imaginative states of the spectator are the keys to understand
what goes on in the R-series. Indeed, as a  perceptual  route through the world depicted,
the R-series essentially involves  perceptual  states. In the case of fiction films,  the R-
series also involves  imagination,  which enables the spectator  to locate  the things  she
perceives in a unitary spatiotemporal system that is not her own. Furthermore,  the R-
series can involve emotions that allows the spectator to evaluate what she perceives in the
world depicted (see Scherer, Schorr, Johnstone 2001). Such emotions do so by affectively
coloring,  so to  say,  the perceptually based fold that  is  mobilized in  the R-series.  For
instance an emotion of fear allows the spectator to evaluate something as dangerous, just
as an emotion of joy allows her to evaluate something as good. In this sense, borrowing
Ed Tan’s  (1996,  65–66) terminology,  we might  call  “fiction emotions”  those that,  in
virtue of being enjoyed in the R-series, are directed towards (and enables evaluation of)
the fictional world, thereby distinguishing them from “artifact emotions”, which, in virtue
of being enjoyed in the C-series, are directed towards (and enables evaluation of) the film
as an artifact in the actual world.
However, the filmmaker’s intentions and the spectator’s embodiment play no role
in the R-series. That is because the R-series essentially is the exploration of an imaginary
world in which neither the filmmaker nor the spectator have a place. Representing the
filmmaker’s  intentions  and  the  spectator’s  body  in  the  R-series  would  amount  to
prejudice the R-pleasure, which precisely consists in the impression of exploring a self-
standing  world  in  a  disembodied  way,  from  the  outside.  However,  intentions  and
embodiment start playing a crucial  role when our appreciation of a film traces the R-
series back to what caused it in the C-series. 
When we start focusing on the C-series, the filmmaker’s intentions can reveal to be
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the source of the perspectives on the world depicted that we have enjoyed in the R-series.
In fact,  in the R-series,  we limit  ourselves to  exploit  a sort  of epistemic luck,  which
allows us to perceive the world depicted from informatively favorable points of view. It is
only by moving from the R-series to the C-series that we can treat such an epistemic luck
as the outcome of the filmmaker’s intentions to make us effectively understand what is
going on in the world depicted.
Something similar happens in the case of embodiment. As argued above, our R-
series experience of the world depicted is disembodied in the sense that this world does
not include the spectator’s body in it. However, when we wonder where the disembodied
experience enjoyed in the R-series comes from, we acknowledge that it is produced by
the interaction, in the C-series, between the film as an artifact and our own body. The
perceptual and emotional states that in the R-series we enjoyed as purely mental attitudes
towards a world in which our body has no place, in the C-series reveal to be states of our
embodied mind that have been generated by the film as an artifact.
An interesting example of the difficulty for an embodiment-based conception of the
film experience to  take the R-series into account  can be found in Vivian Sobchack’s
influential book The Address of the Eye (1992). Sobchack rightly acknowledges that the
perspective of the spectator as an embodied subject is different from the perspective on
the  world  depicted  that  the  film  provides  us  with.  Yet,  I  argue,  she  overlooks  the
specificity of the latter perspective, namely its being an R-series. In fact, she states that
this perspective also is essentially embodied, in the sense that it depends on the “body” of
the film: “We recognize the moving picture as the work of an anonymous  and sign-
producing body subject intentionally marking visible choices with the very behavior of its
bodily being. However, these choices are not initiated by the movement of our bodies or
our intending consciousness. They are seen and visible as the visual and physical choices
of some body other than ourselves […] That some body is the film’s body” (Sobchack,
1992, 278) – “The camera its perceptive organ, the projector its expressive organ, the
screen its discrete and material occupation of worldly space” (299). 
As a consequence of her conception of the film experience as embodied all the way
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through, Sobchack conflates the R-series, in which we enjoy a perceptual perspective on
the world depicted, with the C-series, in which we recognize that such a perspective is the
outcome of a technological process involving the “body” of the film. Thus, Sobchack
ends up in treating a secondary level of the film experience, namely the acknowledgment
of the film as a technological artifact, as if it was the primary one. Yet, this conception
prevents the most  basic cinematic  pleasure,  namely the R-pleasure,  which consists  in
enjoying a perceptual perspective on a world in which neither our body nor the film itself
have a place. 
8. Why to watch Au hasard Balthazar twice
At the beginning of  Au hasard Balthazar  (R. Bresson, 1966) we see a newborn
donkey, then a girl who caresses him, and then a boy and a man which, we guess, are the
brother and the father of the girl. Then our viewpoint changes by means of a temporal
jump that allows us to see the father and his children bringing that donkey to their house.
Then, we temporally jump to the moment in which the two children baptize their donkey
naming him Balthazar. Some spatial jumps allow us to recognize two other participants to
this ceremony; one is a friend of the two children who is called Marie; the other is their
elder sister, a girl who lies in a bed and seems to be seriously sick. After that, a temporal
jump makes us see a farmer who accompanies Balthazar in his stable. Then, another jump
leads  us  to  see the  two children  who play  with  their  friend Marie  and their  donkey
Balthazar, first in the barn (fig. 1), and then in the garden (fig. 2), where their sick sister
observes  them.  Finally,  we  temporally  jump  to  the  moment  when  the  owners  of





All of this occurs in the R-series. In fact, as showed in the previous lines, we can
describe our experience of Au hasard Balthazar’s beginning only in terms of perceptual
perspectives on the world depicted, without the need of making reference to the film as
an artifact. We can speak in terms of viewpoints and their continuous or discontinuous
changes,  without  the  need  of  making  reference  to  camera  movements  or  editing.
Likewise, the fact that we see things in black and white can be treated as a modifier of
our experience of the world depicted without the need of making reference to the film as
an artifact. Even when we hear non-diegetic music, that is, from the happy moment in
which  the  children  play  with  the  donkey until  the  sad  moment  when they leave  the
countryside, we are not forced to treat this music as a feature of the film as an artifact. 
Rather, we can enjoy this music as a modifier of our experience of what is going on
in the world depicted. In this sense, film music, just as the black and white texture, is a
perceptual non-diegetic feature. By contrast, the  superimposed inscription “Les années
passent” (“Years go by”), which we read when – a little later in the film – we see a grown
Balthazar cruelly exploited by his new owners, is a discursive non-diegetic feature, which
forces us to treat the film as an artifact.
The R-pleasure that the beginning of Au hasard Balthazar provides us with consists
in the peculiar exploration of the world of Balthazar and his young owners. This is what I
have tried to verbally described just above. This pleasure is crucial to the appreciation of
the film, but there is another pleasure that is equally important, namely, the C-pleasure.
This consists in wondering what caused the R-pleasure, thereby paying the attention to
the C-series, in which we appreciate the film as an artifact that allows us to explore (in
the R-series) the world depicted. For instance, we can appreciate the way in which the
film begins with a close-up of the donkey and then gradually reveals the girl, his father
and his  brother  by means  of  a  diagonal  camera  movement  that  ends  up in  a  sort  of
triangular  configuration  having the three characters  as its  vertexes.  Likewise,  we can
appreciate  the way in which the temporal  jumps in  the R-series  are  realized  through
editing cuts that involve lap dissolves.  In particular,  focusing on the lap dissolve that
links the two scenes in which the children play with the donkey, we can appreciate the
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symmetry produced by the skillful inversion of the figure/background relation; in the first
shot the girl  and Balthazar  are in the foreground while  the boy and Marie are in the
background (fig. 1); in the second shot it is the other way round (fig. 2). Furthermore, in
the whole segment of the R-series that begins with this lap dissolve and finishes with
Balthazar’s owners leaving the countryside, we can appreciate Bresson’s expressive use
of Franz Schubert’s  Piano Sonata No. 20  as a way of emphasizing  the intensity,  the
fragility and the evanescence of childhood’s happiness. 
This analysis of  Au hasard Balthazar  ultimately shows that both the R-pleasure,
which comes from the exploration of a world in the R-series, and the C-pleasure, which
comes  from  the  appreciation  of  an  artifact  in  the  C-series,  are  highly  valuable.  In
principle, we might enjoy them both while watching a film since we are able to switch
from the R-series to the C-series in our film experience. However, the first time that we
see a certain film, the R-series tends to capture our attention thereby preventing us from
fully enjoying plenty of features of the film as an artifact that lie in the C-series. That is
why we need to watch a film twice, or even more than twice, in order to fully appreciate
it. Even if the experience of the world depicted remains the same, scrutinizing the film as
an artifact can provide us with further layers of pleasure at each new watching.
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i In principle, twoseriesness also applies to naturally moving things in which one can see something else moving. For 
instance, one can see a moving dog in a moving cloud. In this case, the C-series would represent the moving cloud, the 
R-series would represent the moving dog, and the sky would play the role played by the screen in the film experience 
(on the analogy between the sky and the screen, see McGinn 2005, 26). One might call this ‘a naturally produced 
cinematic experience’. Thanks to Alberto Voltolini for drawing my attention to this possibility. 
ii The content/attitude distinction can allow me to address two problems that are traditionally raised against Wollheimian 
accounts of seeing-in. First, how the content of the R-series is related to that of the C-series. Second, how the R-series 
can have a perceptual nature. I contend that the R-series involves perceptual states having a distinctive attitude that can 
include features such as ‘being black and white’ or ‘being framed’, which are instead represented in the content of the C-
series. I defend this view in my (still unpublished) paper How We See Things in Pictures. An Attitudinal Approach to 
Seeing-in, which I presented at the PaCS Seminar, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris, December 11th 2017. This application of 
the content/attitude distinction to the pictorial experience also allows me to avoid the commitment to the claim that 
seeing-in for films is just inflected seeing-in. The latter is a case of seeing-in such that “what is seen in a surface includes
properties a full characterization of which needs to make reference to that surface’s design” (Hopkins 2010, 158). In the 
case of the film experience, inflected seeing-in would recruit the features of the C-series content to the features of the R-
series content. Yet, my account of the film experience is not committed to inflected seeing-in because it claims that the 
features of the C-series content are recruited to the R-series attitude, not to its content. My account is just committed to 
what one might call ‘attitudinally inflected seeing-in’, but I am happy with this. For a thorough account of inflection in 
the film experience, see Robert Hopkins’ paper in this collection.
iii In films such as The Gangs of New York or Vicky Cristina Barcelona the neutrality of the voice over with respect to the 
fictional world leads spectators to treat this voice as a discursive feature. However, when the voice over belongs to a 
character things are more complicate. In principle, spectators might treat such voice as a diegetic feature thereby 
enjoying it directly in the R-series. In this case, the voice over becomes a component of a complex perceptual experience
that allows us to see events that occur at a certain time while listening to a character that speaks, through the voice over, 
at a different time. We can enjoy such experience, for instance, in Millennium Mambo (Hou H.-h., 2001), in which we 
see events that occur in a fictional 2001 while listening to the voice of the protagonist who comments on them after the 
fact, in a fictional 2011. Thanks to Alberto Voltolini for leading me to consider this sort of cases. 
iv In his paper for this collection, Gregory Currie treats camera movements in La regle du jeu (J. Renoir, 1939) as “a 
surrogate for, if not a trace of, the corresponding movements of an agent”. However, according to the account I propose, 
such an agency is something that one can only secondarily appreciate by tracing the change of perspective experienced 
in the R-series back to its causes in the C-series.
v Following Currie (1999), I conceive of documentaries as motion pictures that depict their subjects in virtue of being 
traces of them. That is to say that I treat documentaries as essentially factive pictures, which entails that the facts 
depicted have actually occurred.
